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Abstract—The hardware Trojan threat has motivated develop-
ment of Trojan detection schemes at all stages of the integrated
circuit (IC) lifecycle. While the majority of existing schemes
focus on ICs at test-time, there are many unique advantages
offered by post-deployment/run-time Trojan detection. However,
run-time approaches have been underutilized with prior work
highlighting the challenges of implementing them with limited
hardware resources. In this paper, we propose innovative low-
overhead approaches for run-time Trojan detection which exploit
the thermal sensors already available in many modern systems
to detect deviations in power/thermal profiles caused by Trojan
activation. Simulation results using state-of-the-art tools on pub-
licly available Trojan benchmarks verify that our approaches can
detect active Trojans quickly and with few false positives.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emerging trend of outsourcing integrated circuit (IC)
design and fabrication has created new opportunities called
hardware Trojan attacks that can seriously jeopardize the
integrity of an electronic system. Hardware Trojans can change
hardware functionality, reduce system reliability, and leak
valuable/sensitive information. Since this represents a danger-
ous threat to all sectors that rely on ICs (military, financial,
power, etc.), robust methods to detect Trojans are becoming
imperative. Unfortunately, Trojan detection happens to be a
very challenging problem. Attackers have so many Trojans of
varying types and sizes at their disposal [1]. Trojans are often
triggered by extremely rare events. Finally, measurement noise
and fabrication variation can mask Trojan presence [2], [3].
To overcome these challenges, detection approaches have
been proposed at three stages of the IC lifecycle: design-
time, test-time, and run-time. The majority of existing schemes
occur at test-time where the I/O and side channel behavior
(delay, power, etc.) of suspect ICs are compared to “golden”
models/ICs. Design-time approaches [4], [5] have been utilized
(mostly) to support test-time detection. Run-time approaches
have been investigated significantly less, but possess several
advantages over their counterparts. First, test-time approaches
can fail for Trojans with small well-placed triggers (eg. one
gate) that do not get activated at test-time [6]. Run-time
approaches on the other hand can be utilized for the entire
lifetime of the IC. Hence, any Trojan missed during test-time
can be found if the Trojan ever gets activated (eg. [7], [8]).
Second, an IC with an inactive Trojan performs essentially
the same functions as a Trojan-free IC. Effective run-time
detection allows one to still deploy a Trojan-inserted IC and
then either disable the IC entirely or bypass the Trojan logic
[9], [10] if the Trojan ever gets activated. The main drawback
to run-time approaches has been their large overheads [2]. For
example, the path delay characterization approach proposed
in [7] suffers from considerable area overhead for modern
designs with millions of paths [1].
Main Contributions. In this paper, we propose innovative low-
overhead approaches for online Trojan detection that take
advantage of the relationship between power and temperature.
When a Trojan gets activated at run-time, it can have a
significant impact on the system’s power consumption which
will be reflected in the system’s thermal profile. Furthermore,
while direct monitoring of side channels (current, delay)
typically requires significant overheads, thermal sensors and
infrastructure are already available in many modern systems
for dynamic thermal management. A summary of our main
contributions is as follows:
• We propose a novel framework for temperature-based Tro-
jan detection which consists of design-time, test-time, and
run-time phases. In the design phase, we statistically charac-
terize an IC’s power/thermal dynamics and optimally place
thermal sensors. The test-time phase is used to calibrate
each IC due to fabrication variation. The run-time phase
integrates the information from the previous phases with
thermal sensor measurements to detect Trojan activation.
• We propose two mechanisms to detect Trojan activation
during run-time. The first is a local sensor-based approach
that uses information from thermal sensors, statistical infor-
mation provided by the test phase, and hypothesis testing.
The second is a global approach that exploits correlation
between sensors and maintains track of the IC’s thermal
profile using a Kalman filter (KF).
• We test our detection mechanisms on five publicly available
Trojan benchmarks (from [11]) and use state-of-the-art Ca-
dence simulation tools to compute power/thermal profiles.
In all but one benchmark, the proposed approaches are
capable of detecting Trojan activation quickly (less than
210ms) and with very few false-positives.
Outline. In Section II, we review Trojans and Trojan detection.
In Section III, we discuss further the motivation for our
temperature-based detection. Our specific problem and its
challenges are clearly defined in Section IV. The proposed
framework and detection mechanisms are discussed in Sec-
tion V. Experimental results are discussed in Section VI. We
conclude and discuss future work in the last section.
II. BACKGROUND
Trojan Anatomy. Trojans consist of two components [1]: (i)
The Trojan trigger waits for a special event, such as a rare
external input pattern or internal logic state, and then activates
the Trojan’s attack. Before the Trojan is triggered, the IC
containing the Trojan functions mainly as intended (excluding
the trigger’s activity); (ii) After the Trojan is triggered, the
Trojan payload is activated and changes the IC’s functionality.
In this paper, we refer to ICs with and without Trojans as
Trojan-inserted and Trojan-free respectively. Trojan-inserted
ICs whose payloads have been triggered and not triggered are
referred to as Trojan-active and Trojan-inactive respectively.
Trojan Detection Schemes. Detecting hardware Trojans is a
very challenging problem. Deterministic and exhaustive vali-
dation are infeasible due to the variety of Trojans available to
an attacker [2]. Furthermore, since Trojans are often triggered
by rare events, conventional post-manufacturing tests which
only target common and repeatable faults cannot be relied
upon. Thus, researchers have had to develop new schemes to
outwit attackers. Three main approaches have been proposed
in the literature which are classified based on their place in
the IC’s lifecycle: test-time, run-time, and design-time.
1) Test-time: These approaches consist of additional tests
that take place after conventional post-manufacturing testing.
There are two types. Logic-based schemes develop directed
test patterns that activate Trojan payloads in order to detect
errors in the output. Side Channel-based approaches measure
physical parameters, such as power consumption and path
delay, of suspect ICs, and compares them with expected pa-
rameters of a “golden” model or Trojan-free IC. Unlike logic-
based, the Trojan payload need not necessarily be activated
because the trigger alone may impact IC delay, power, etc.
2) Run-time Monitoring: These approaches are utilized
after the IC has been deployed and have several unique
advantages. For example, if the Trojan remains inactive (i.e.
not triggered) for the IC’s entire lifetime, the IC will always
perform its intended functions. Hence, a valid option would be
to deploy the Trojan-inserted IC and monitor its behavior. If
deviation from correct behavior is ever detected, the monitor
can either disable the IC entirely or bypass the Trojan logic to
maintain correct operation (eg. [9], [10]). Resource overheads
have been the main disadvantage of run-time monitoring [2].
3) Design-for-Trust (DFT): These are design-time strate-
gies that aid test-time approaches. Examples include [4]
and [5] which use scan flip-flops to increase the probability
of Trojan activation and enhance side channel analysis.
Integrated Solution. [2] suggests an integrated approach that
utilizes all of the above approaches to provide more compre-
hensive coverage of Trojans. Logic and side channel-based
detection provide coverage of small and large Trojans respec-
tively while run-time monitors act as “last lines of defense”
for Trojan-inserted ICs that bypass test-time schemes.
III. MOTIVATION
In this paper, we investigate run-time approaches based on
temperature which exploit the change in power and tempera-
ture caused by activation of Trojan payload.
A. Power Consumption of Active/Inactive Trojan Payload
Prior work suggests that it can be difficult to detect certain
Trojan triggers and payloads at test-time. The triggers can be
very small (eg. one gate) and hidden in nets with low switching
activity and leakage power [6]. Furthermore, by combining the
Trojan trigger with power gating techniques [6], the Trojan’s
impact on I/O and side-channels can be almost completely
blocked even for very large payload circuitry. Such designs
can easily bypass test-time approaches since their behavior is
indistinguishable from Trojan-free designs while the Trojan is
inactive. Run-time approaches on the other hand can monitor
an IC for its entire lifetime and detect deviation of Trojan-
active ICs from both Trojan-free and Trojan-inactive ICs.
As a motivating example, we look at power consumption of
Trojan-inactive and Trojan-active ICs for a publicly available
Trojan benchmark: RS232-T900 from trust-HUB [11]. RS232-
T900 is a micro-UART core with a Trojan inserted in its
transmitter. The Trojan is triggered by a sequence of four
transmission messages and its payload prevents any further
transmission. We determined power and layout information by
simulating, synthesizing, and placing the design with Cadence
SimVision, RTL Compiler, and Encounter tools. The average
power across the IC in a 250µs time window for Trojan-
inactive and Trojan-active ICs is shown in Figure 1. Com-
paring the two cases, one can see that the power differs in the
upper left quadrant where the transmitter hardware is located.
Transmission is blocked in the Trojan-active IC whereas the
Trojan-inactive IC transmits and receives data at all times.
Overall, there is a 40% decrease in total power consumption
after the Trojan is triggered.
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Fig. 1: Avg. power consumption (nW) in a 250µs time window across Trojan-
inactive and Trojan-active ICs for the RS232-T900 benchmark.











Fig. 2: IC broken into grids and RC thermal model within dotted region
B. Relationship between Power and Temperature
Temperature is a strong function of power consumption.
Hence, changes in power caused by an active Trojan should
also be reflected in the IC’s thermal profile. Below, we
discuss the relationship between power and temperature and
the advantages of temperature-based Trojan detection.
RC Thermal Model. We illustrate the link between power and
temperature using the popular RC thermal model [12]. In this
model, the IC is divided into grids and the temperature and
power consumption of each grid at time t are represented as
constants (see Figure 2). A circuit is used to estimate the
IC’s thermal profile where node voltage and circuit current
are analogous to temperature and power/heat flow in each
grid. Voltage ground is analogous to the environment’s ambi-
ent temperature. Thermal capacitance and thermal resistance
between neighboring nodes determine how heat flows between
nodes/grids of the IC. Temperature for the entire IC can be




(Ti(t) − Tj(t)) + Ci
dTi(t)
dt − Pi(t) = 0 ∀i (1)
where Ti(t) and Pi(t) are the temperature and power dissi-
pated at node i and time t; Ci denotes thermal capacitance at
node i; Rij denotes thermal resistance between nodes i and
j; and Ni is the set of all neighbors for node i. The above
equations are often written in a discrete matrix form [13]:
T⃗ [k] = AT⃗ [k − 1] + BP⃗ [k − 1] (2)
where T⃗ [k] and P⃗ [k] are temperature and power vectors (each
element corresponds to one node/grid) at discrete timestep k;
A and B are coefficient matrices that depend upon the RC
circuit and timestep duration. The above formulation is quite
flexible and has been used to simulate thermal dynamics as
well as perform online temperature tracking [14], [15].
Advantages of Temperature-based Detection. Few run-time
approaches take advantage of side-channel information be-
cause of the overheads involved. For example, a path delay
characterization approach was proposed in [7] which, while
effective, suffers from considerable area overhead for modern
designs with millions of paths [1]. The current sensor approach
in [8] should also come with significant area and power
overheads. Temperature-based Trojan detection is an unex-
plored avenue which should have lower overheads compared
to previous run-time approaches since many electronic sys-
tems are already equipped with thermal sensors for dynamic
thermal management (DTM). For example, the AMD Operton
multicore processor has 38 thermal sensors. Furthermore,
prior work has shown that the infrastructure for run-time
thermal estimation has low hardware and software overheads
as well. For instance, [15] used steady state Kalman filtering
to track IC temperature with only five sensors. By combining
the existing DTM infrastructure with new Trojan detection
mechanisms, it should be possible to detect the changes in
IC power/temperature caused by active Trojan payload.
IV. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND CHALLENGES
Our problem is inspired by the example discussed in Sec-
tion III-A (RS232-T900). We assume that there are three pos-
sible states that an electronic system or IC can be in: Trojan-
free, Trojan-inactive, and Trojan-active. Each state is defined
by a set of statistical characteristics Sf , Si, Sa respectively.
The Trojan-free and Trojan-inactive characteristics, while not
necessarily identical, are close enough such that the Trojan-
inserted IC can evade test-time Trojan detection methods (i.e.
Sf ≈ Si). The Trojan-active characteristics Sa on the other
hand differ significantly from the other two. Our goal is a run-
time temperature-based approach that can detect changes from
Sf and Si to Sa after the Trojan is activated. Note, we are
not concerned with Trojan-inactive ICs since, prior to Trojan
activation, they essentially provide the same functionality as
Trojan-free ICs. Stated formally, our problem is:
Given two hypotheses of the system’s state:{ H0 The state is Trojan-free or Trojan-inactive
H1 The state is Trojan-active
Use thermal sensor observations to determine if the IC’s state
(characteristics) correspond to H0 (Sf , Si) or H1 (Sa).
The above problem has various challenges to overcome
some of which are specific to temperature tracking and some
of which are common to Trojan detection:
• Golden IC/model: Most Trojan detection approaches rely
on the existence of a “golden model” to distinguish Trojan-
free and Trojan-inserted ICs. In our case, we assume that
the Trojan-free design is given and from it we can compute
Sf characteristics to function as our golden model.
• Autonomous detection: Since the Sf characteristics are
known and Sf ≈ Si, we should be able to easily track
temperature for Trojan-free and Trojan-inactive designs as
in prior work. The challenge is detecting active Trojan ICs
because the Sa characteristics are unknown. We propose
two mechanisms for detecting Trojan activation at run-time.
• Sensor Infrastructure and Noise: Prior work has shown
that sensor placement, number of sensors, sensor noise,
etc. have a profound impact on temperature tracking [16].
In this paper, we vary the number of sensors to see the
impact on temperature-based Trojan detection. One of our
approaches uses the Kalman Filter which explicitly accounts
for measurement noise.
• Fabrication Variation (FV): FV makes it more challenging
to track temperature as well as detect Trojans. For tracking,
FV results in larger uncertainty in the estimated thermal
profile [15]. For Trojan detection, FV makes it difficult to
distinguish between deviations in power/temperature due to
manufacturing and Trojan presence [3]. In our approach,
calibration is performed for each IC to ensure robustness in
the face of FV.
V. TEMPERATURE-BASED DETECTION
In this section, we discuss the overall framework and
algorithms for our temperature-based Trojan detection. While
detection itself occurs at run-time, we also require some addi-
tional offline profiling steps to deal with the above challenges.
An overview of entire approach with design, test, and run-
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Fig. 3: Phases of the Proposed Approach
A. Design Phase
As discussed above, side channel-based Trojan detection
often relies on a “golden” model. Our approach assumes that
we have access to the Trojan-free design from which we
can obtain statistical characteristics (Sf ) of switching activity,
power consumption, thermal dynamics, etc. We leverage this
knowledge to determine optimal sensor placement for temper-
ature tracking/Trojan detection.
Design Profiling. We profile the Trojan-free designs using
the RC thermal model (see Section III-B), benchmarks, and
either state-of-the-art simulation tools or prototype ICs. The
RC thermal model divides the power consumed by the design
into grids and uses a vector P⃗ to represent power consumed in
the grids. The statistical approaches for temperature tracking
and Trojan detection used in this paper require probability dis-
tribution functions (pdfs) to summarize the design’s expected
power and/or temperature. Benchmarks that are representative
of the design’s expected workload along with simulation tools
are used to estimate the pdfs. Alternatively, IC prototypes that
are verified as Trojan-free can be used. We approximate the
pdfs as Gaussian with mean vectors µ⃗p and µ⃗T and covariance
matrices Qp and QT (for power and temperature respectively).
Sensor Placement. We adopt the sensor placement approach
from [16] which uses the temperature covariance matrix QT .
Specifically, sensors are placed in a greedy fashion to minimize










where qi,j denotes the element at location i and j of matrix
QT (i.e. correlation in temperature between IC grids i and j).
B. Test Phase
When the design phase is complete, we fabricate the ICs.
At this point, we assume that some Trojan-inserted ICs are
fabricated and inserted into the supply chain.
IC Parameter Calibration. Our test phase is mainly used to deal
with fabrication variation. Fabrication variation (FV) results in
ICs that have different physical, electrical, and performance
parameters from the nominal design. As discussed above,
FV makes it more challenging to accurately detect Trojans
and track temperature. To ensure robustness, we must have
accurate power/thermal statistics (µ⃗p, µ⃗T , Qp, QT ) for each
IC under test (ICUT). One can accomplish this by applying
test vectors to the ICUT, measuring power consumption,
and estimating the pdfs after fabrication. For example, gate-
level characterization has been applied in prior work [3] to
successfully profile IC gate parameters. Temperature-based
approaches which utilize infra-red cameras and Expectation
Maximization are also applicable [17].
Test-time Detection. Prior test-time approaches could also be
used at this point to remove some of the Trojan-inserted
ICs. The proposed run-time approach would then detect the
remaining Trojan-inserted ICs as they are activated in the field.
C. Run-time Phase
As discussed in Section IV, our main problem is to decide
the correct hypothesis (state of the system): H0 or H1. In
other words, is the IC Trojan-free/Trojan-inactive or Trojan-
active? In this section, we propose two mechanisms to solve
the problem. The first is a local sensor-based approach that
uses an hypothesis testing (HT) framework. The second is a
global approach that exploits correlation between sensors and
maintains track of the IC’s thermal profile with a Kalman filter.
1) Hypothesis Testing (HT) Approach: For simplicity, let us
suppose we have one sensor measurement at timestep k de-
noted by S[k] from which we shall decide the state (we’ll con-
sider more sensors later). In an hypothesis testing framework,
one assumes that S[k] can only come from one of two pdfs: S0
or S1 which correspond to temperature in Trojan-free/Trojan-
inactive and Trojan-active ICs respectively. We shall choose
the correct state as the one with the highest probability of
occurrence given S[k] (i.e. argmaxPr(Hx
∣∣S[k]), x ∈ {0, 1}).







∣∣S0)Pr(S0) < Pr(S[k]∣∣S1)Pr(S1) (4)
where Pr(x) and Pr(x
∣∣y) denote the prior probability of
x and probability of x given y. Basically, an IC shall be
regarded as Trojan-free/inactive (Trojan-active) if the measure-
ment comes from S0 (S1) with higher probability. While this
methodology is theoretically sound, it is difficult to directly
apply to our problem for two reasons. First, one cannot assume
that all measurements come from single stationary pdf (i.e. one
that is time invariant) since the IC temperature varies with
time. Second, even if the pdfs were stationary, we do not have
access to the Trojan-active design and therefore cannot accu-
rately estimate S1, Pr(S[k]|S1), or Pr(S1). We get around
these issues by making several simplifying assumptions.
Stable State Temperature. The first issue no longer presents
a problem when the IC’s temperature has reached a stable
state. Put simply, if an IC’s power consumption is similar
for a long period of time, the IC’s temperature will end up
converging to a “stable state” [18] where measurements of its
thermal state are actually samples from a stationary pdf. In this
paper, we run benchmarks with random inputs on the ICUT
until reaching the stable state. We then take measurements and
approximate S0 as Gaussian with mean µ0 and variance σ20 .
Trojan pdf Estimate: To overcome the second issue, we must
make some assumptions about S1. Basically, we exploit the
fact that S0 and S1 must be slightly different. We assume that
the mean of S1 (µ1) differs from S0’s known mean (µ0) by
some fixed percentage difference S% and both possess the
same variance (σ0 = σ1.) If S% < 0 (S% > 0), Trojan
activation causes the IC to lose (gain) some functionality. This
is the best we can do to apply the theory because we have little
if any knowledge of the actual Trojan-active design.
Single sensor Decision Rule. With the above assumptions,
one can easily come up with a decision using Eqn. (4). For
simplicity, we assume that Pr(S0) = Pr(S1) = .5 and












, x ∈ {0, 1} (5)
Multi-sensor Decision Rule. For multiple sensors, we can
easily extend the above rule by collecting the sensor measure-
ments as a vector S⃗[k] and using multivariate Gaussian pdfs.
For simplicity, we take a simple ad-hoc approach instead. We
evaluate Eqn. (4) for each sensor and come to decision (H0
or H1) by majority voting.
Overheads. A high-level overview of the HT approach and its
overheads is shown in Figure 4. HT’s offline overhead includes
computing stable state pdfs (S0 and S1 for each sensor).
At run-time, the probabilities of sensor measurements for
hypotheses H0 and H1 are computed and compared resulting
in a 1-bit vote for each sensor. Majority voting is used to
combine the decisions of z sensors and obtain a final decision.
All these operations are simple and the overall complexity
depends only on the number of sensors z.
2) Kalman Filter based Approach: This is a global sensor-
based approach that exploits correlation between sensors and
uses a Kalman Filter (KF) to dynamically track the system’s
thermal profile at run-time. An autocorrelation based met-
ric then decides between hypotheses H0 and H1 (Trojan-
free/Trojan-inactive and Trojan-active).
Temperature Tracking Via Kalman Filter. We track IC tem-
perature at run-time using the standard Kalman filtering (KF)
approach developed in prior work [14], [15]. For simplicity,
we only consider dynamic power, but leakage power can be
handled as well [19]. The KF relies on a state-space equation
to model the random dynamics of the state being estimated and
on a measurement equation to relate measurements with the
state being estimated. The state-space equation for temperature
tracking is the discrete form RC thermal model equation
discussed in Section III-B (copied below for convenience)
T⃗ [k] = AT⃗ [k − 1] + BP⃗ [k − 1] (6)
The above equation assumes that the current thermal state T⃗ [k]
depends on the previous thermal state T⃗ [k − 1] (Markovian
assumption) and also local power dissipation P⃗ [k − 1]. Due
to variations in the voltage supply noise, system workload,
etc., the power P⃗ is random at each timestep and T⃗ [k] cannot
be precisely computed with the state-space model alone. To
improve the estimate, the KF uses measurements collected by
thermal sensors and the following measurement model
S⃗[k] = HT⃗ [k] + v⃗[k] (7)
where S⃗[k] is a vector of sensor measurements at timestep k;
H is a transformation matrix based on the sensor placement;
and v⃗[k] is a Gaussian random vector with zero mean and
known covariance R [14] representing measurement noise.
The KF estimates the thermal state of a chip as follows. P⃗ [k]
is modeled as a Gaussian random vector with known mean
µ⃗p and covariance Qp (which we determine in the design/test
phases). KF estimation is then performed recursively with
predict and update steps. In the predict step, the KF uses µ⃗p
and the previous temperature estimate to predict the IC’s new
thermal state. In the update step, the KF corrects this estimate
based on new sensor measurements. The following equations
are used at each timestep
predict: T⃗ [k|k − 1] = AT⃗ [k|k − 1] + Bµ⃗p (8)
C[k|k − 1] = AC[k|k − 1]AT + BQpBT (9)
update: e⃗[k] = S⃗[k] − HT⃗ [k
∣∣k − 1] (10)
T⃗ [k|k] = T⃗ [k|k − 1] + K[k]e⃗[k] (11)
K[k] = C[k|k − 1]HT (R + HC[k|k − 1]HT )−1 (12)
C[k|k] = (I − K[k]H)C[k|k − 1] (13)
T⃗ [k|k] and T⃗ [k|k−1] are estimates of the temperature at time
k computed with and without sensor information respectively;
C[k|k − 1] and C[k|k] are the error covariance matrices
associated with T⃗ [k|k−1] and T⃗ [k|k]; e⃗[k] is the KF residual
which reflects the discrepancy between the predicted and
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Fig. 5: Global Kalman Filter (KF) approach with z sensors and m × n grid
the Kalman gain at the kth step and is chosen to minimize the
error in T⃗ [k|k].
Steady State Kalman Filter. When the statistical characteristics
of P⃗ and measurement noise are stationary (or do not change
for relatively long time), the KF stabilizes which means
C[k|k − 1],C[k|k], and K[k] converge to static values. This
is referred to as the KF steady state During the steady state,
even though the temperature may change with time, the error
associated with the estimates remains the same. The steady
state allows one to create low overhead implementations of
the KF [15] by replacing C[k|k − 1],C[k|k], and K[k] in
Eqns. (8) to (13) by constants.
Autocorrelation-based Detection Rule. While the KF can be
used to accurately track temperature, we also need a rule to
decide on the correct state (H0 or H1). Our decision rule
is based on the KF residual and uses the autocorrelation
function of the residual process. In the KF, residual e⃗[k]
represents the discrepancy between the predicated temperature
and thermal sensor measurements. If e⃗[k] is small (large), the
two agree (disagree) on the thermal state. Assuming the state-
space model/parameters and the sensor noise covariance are
reasonably accurate, the autocorrelation of the residual should
be close to zero on average [20]. When a Trojan gets activated,
the state-space model (which does not account for the power
of an active Trojan) becomes less accurate and should cause
the autocorrelation to diverge from zero.
We use the following method to detect a Trojan at timestep
x. We record the residual in the N previous timesteps of the






e⃗[i] · e⃗[i − 1]T
)
(14)
This cost is the average autocorrelation of the residual process
in the last N timesteps. To decide if a Trojan is activated,
we define thresholds aT and V . If (|â[x]| > aT ) for more
than V consecutive timesteps, we assume a Trojan has been
activated (i.e. state H1). aT and V are parameters that tune
the aggressiveness of the decision rule.
Overheads. A high-level overview of the KF approach and its
overheads is shown in Figure 5. The main offline overheads
are estimating the power statistics (µ⃗p and Qp) computing
the steady state Kalman gain matrix K. During run-time, the
KF performs some matrix-vector multiplications and vector
additions/subtractions (Eqns. (8), (10), (11)) at each timestep
k. The size of the matrices/vectors and complexity of these
operations depend on the number of grids in the RC thermal
model (mn) and the number of sensors (z). Running averages
of the autocorrelation â for the last V timesteps must kept and
the final state is chosen based on V thresholding operations
3) Qualitative Comparison: The salient differences be-
tween the above two detection mechanisms are as follows:
• Stable State Assumption: Hypothesis testing (HT) requires
the system under test to be in a stable thermal state so that
the sensor measurements can be compared with stationary
pdfs. The Kalman Filter (KF) approach works with the
system in any thermal state since it tracks the system’s
thermal profile at all timesteps.
• Sensor Correlation: HT is a local approach that compares
each sensor measurement with its corresponding stable state
pdf in an independent fashion. Correlation between the
sensors is not exploited and the final decision is made
based on a majority vote. The KF is a global approach that
exploits the correlation between sensors to accurately track
temperature and detect Trojans.
• Run-time Overheads: The KF approach clearly has larger
run-time overheads than the HT approach (see Figs. 4
and 5). While the HT approach primarily works with scalar
values and computes 1-bit decisions, the KF approach
requires matrix-vector storage and computations which are
more expensive (O(mn)).
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Setup
Benchmarks. We tested our Trojan detection schemes on five
publicly available Trojan benchmarks (from trust-HUB [11]):
1) RS232-T900: was discussed in Section III-A.
2) s38417-T300: contains a Trojan trigger with activation
probability of 1.7e-44. Once activated, the payload leaks
the value of a specific net through a 29 stage ring-oscillator.
3) BasicRSA-T200: is an RSA encoder with a Trojan trig-
gered by a specific plaintext input. The payload perma-
nently disables encoding of the plaintext.
4) MC8051-T300: is an implementation of the 8051 micro-
processor with a Trojan. The Trojan is triggered when a
specific string is sent through the UART and the payload
blocks new messages from the UART.
5) MC8051-T600: The Trojan is activated by an external
interrupt and disables 8051 instructions containing jumps.
We determined power and layout information in the above
benchmarks by simulating, synthesizing, and placing each
design with Cadence SimVision, RTL Compiler, and En-
counter tools for two different testbench instances: one which
activates the Trojan (i.e. Trojan-active) and one which does
not (i.e. Trojan-inactive). The difference in power consumption
between the two is shown in Table I for all the benchmarks.
In all cases but one (MC8051-T300) there is a % difference
larger than 25%.
Temperature-based Trojan Detection. We divided the IC into
20 by 16 grids (320 distinct regions). In the design phase,
we computed power and temperature statistics using 250ms
of data generated by Cadence (from the Trojan-free designs)
and the RC thermal model [12]. With the resulting statistics,
we placed sensors as discussed in Section V-A. The number
of sensors we tested were 4, 16, and 32. For simplicity, we
ignored fabrication variation and therefore did not implement
the test phase. For the run-time phase, we computed “real”
dynamic thermal profiles using the RC thermal model. A
steady state Kalman filter (KF) implementation was used to
estimate the thermal profile for Trojan-active and Trojan-
inactive cases. Sensor measurements were made by overlaying
noise onto the “real” thermal profile. We assumed sensor noise
variance of 0.1 which seems like a worst-case for state-of-the-
art thermal sensors [21]. For KF-based Trojan detection, we
TABLE I: % difference in total
power consumption between
Trojan-inactive and Trojan-







TABLE II: Average true positive rate t+, false positive rate f+, and detection time tdec (seconds) for 100 trials. Note detection
time is given in seconds and only includes true positives. ‘-’ indicates no true positives.
RS232-T900 s38417-T300 BasicRSA-T200 MC8051-T300 MC8051-T600
# sensors t+ f+ tdec t+ f+ tdec t+ f+ tdec t+ f+ tdec t+ f+ tdec
HT
4 100% 79% 4.9E-2 100% 45% 1.9E-3 100% 66% 1.7E-2 68% 66% 1.1E-1 100% 64% 5.2E-2
16 100% 0% 1.7E-1 100% 0% 4.3E-3 100% 0% 3.9E-2 0% 0% - 100% 0% 1.6E-1
32 100% 0% 2.1E-1 100% 0% 5.1E-3 100% 0% 4.8E-2 0% 0% - 100% 0% 2.0E-1
KF
4 100% 1% 9.2E-4 100% 2% 3.6E-2 100% 1% 8.4E-3 0% 0% - 100% 2% 3.4E-2
16 100% 0% 6.4E-4 100% 5% 2.6E-2 100% 1% 5.8E-3 1% 1% 1.1E-2 100% 5% 2.4E-2


















































Fig. 6: Average autocorrelation (â) over time with 4 and 32 sensors for s38417-T300
stored N = 50 residuals and chose autocorrelation thresholds
V = 10 and aT = 0.14, 0.24, .035 for 4, 16, and 32 sensors
respectively (based on data from the Trojan-free designs). For
the hypothesis testing (HT) approach, we used mean difference
S% = ±2.5% to estimate the Trojan-active stable state pdf S1.
Except where specified, one can assume the experiments were
conducted while the ICs were in stable thermal states.
B. Results
We conducted 100 trials with random sensor noise on both
the Trojan-inactive and Trojan-active ICs. We recorded the
following data: average true positive rate t+, average false
positive rate f+, and average time tdec to obtain a true positive.
The results are shown for all 5 benchmarks and both detection
mechanisms in Table II. “HT” and “KF” denote the hypothesis
testing and Kalman Filter based approaches.
Hypothesis Testing (HT). HT was able to detect the active
Trojans (true positives) in all the benchmarks with 100%
accuracy except for MC8051-T300. MC8051-T300 had the
smallest difference in power consumption between Trojan-
active and Trojan-inactive cases (see Table I) and thus there
was little deviation in the thermal profile. False positives on
the inactive Trojans were only an issue in the 4 sensor case
and went to 0% with additional sensors. Increasing the number
of sensors also resulted in slower Trojan detection. Put simply,
it took a longer time for the majority of sensors to agree on
a true positive when there were more sensors. On average, 4
sensors could detect Trojans 69.5% faster than 32 (ignoring
MC8051-T300), but with higher false positive rate.
Kalman Filtering (KF). The KF was also very successful with
true positives in every benchmark but one. Once again, the
deviation in power/temperature was too small to detect for
MC8051-T300. The KF had a very low false positive rate in
all instances (≤ 5%). In contrast to HT, increasing the number
of sensors from 4 to 32 improved detection time by 37.3%
on average (ignoring MC8051-T300). Basically, the more
measurements the better the resolution of thermal profile and
autocorrelation â. To illustrate, Figure 6 shows â of Trojan-
inactive (blue) and Trojan-active (red) ICs with 4 and 32
sensors for s38417-T300. The Trojan-inactive autocorrelation
stays below the threshold aT (black line) while the Trojan-
active autocorrelation diverges from zero and exceeds the
threshold. The Trojan-active case crosses the threshold more
quickly in the 32 sensor case.
Note that the results in Table II correspond to the case where
the ICs were in stable thermal states, but we also ran trials
at room temperature. For the latter, the KF yielded similar
results which we have not shown due to space limitations.
Comparing HT and KF. While both approaches worked well,
the KF achieved better results. The KF found active Trojans
71.6% faster on average than HT and was effective even
with only 4 sensors. Also, while the HT approach could only
operate with the ICs in a stable thermal state, the KF worked
in all scenarios. The advantage of HT is its lower overheads.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed novel temperature-based ap-
proaches for online Trojan detection. The experimental results
on real Trojan benchmarks showed that our proposed schemes
were effective in all instances but one. Failure only occurred
when the deviation in power/temperature was too small to de-
tect. While we find these results promising, we shall continue
making improvements to the proposed approaches. In future
work, we plan on evaluating the impact of fabrication variation
and further investigating the implementation overheads.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Tehranipoor and F. Koushanfar, “A survey of hardware trojan
taxonomy and detection,” IEEE Des. Test, 2010.
[2] S. Bhunia, M. Abramovici, D. Agrawal, P. Bradley, M. Hsiao,
J. Plusquellic, and M. Tehranipoor, “Protection against hardware trojan
attacks: Towards a comprehensive solution,” IEEE Des. Test, 2012.
[3] F. Koushanfar and A. Mirhoseini, “A unified framework for multimodal
submodular integrated circuits trojan detection,” IEEE TIFS, 2011.
[4] H. Salmani, M. Tehranipoor, and J. Plusquellic, “A novel technique
for improving hardware trojan detection and reducing trojan activation
time,” IEEE TVLSI, 2012.
[5] ——, “A layout-aware approach for improving localized switching to
detect hardware trojans in integrated circuits,” in Proc. WIFS, 2010.
[6] S. Wei, K. Li, F. Koushanfar, and M. Potkonjak, “Hardware trojan horse
benchmark via optimal creation and placement of malicious circuitry,”
in Proc. DAC, 2012.
[7] J. Li and J. Lach, “At-speed delay characterization for ic authentication
and trojan horse detection,” in Proc. HOST, 2008.
[8] S. Narasimhan, W. Yueh, X. Wang, S. Mukhopadhyay, and S. Bhunia,
“Improving ic security against trojan attacks through integration of
security monitors,” IEEE Des. Test, 2012.
[9] M. Abramovici and P. Bradley, “Integrated circuit security: new threats
and solutions,” in Proc. Annual CSIIR Workshop, 2009.
[10] M. Hicks, M. Finnicum, S. King, M. Martin, and J. Smith, “Overcoming
an untrusted computing base: Detecting and removing malicious hard-
ware automatically,” in IEEE Symp. Security and Privacy, 2010.
[11] trust HUB.org, http://trust-hub.org/resources/benchmarks.
[12] K. Skadron, M. Stan, K. Sankaranarayanan, W. Huang, S. Velusamy,
and D. Tarjan, “Temperature-aware microarchitecture: Modeling and
implementation,” ACM TACO, 2004.
[13] Y. Zhang and A. Srivastava, “Adaptive and autonomous thermal tracking
for high performance computing systems,” in Proc. DAC, 2010.
[14] S. Sharifi, C. Liu, and T. Rosing, “Accurate temperature estimation for
efficient thermal managemen,” Proc. ISQED, 2008.
[15] Y. Zhang, A. Srivastava, and M. Zahran, “On-chip sensor-driven efficient
thermal profile estimation algorithms,” ACM TODAES, 2010.
[16] Y. Zhang, B. Shi, and A. Srivastava, “A statistical framework for
designing on-chip thermal sensing infrastructure in nano-scale systems,”
in Proc. ISPD, 2010.
[17] Y. Zhang and A. Srivastava, “Statistical characterization of chip power
behavior at post-fabrication stage,” in Proc. IGCC, 2011.
[18] D. Forte and A. Srivastava, “Energy and thermal-aware video coding
via encoder/decoder workload balancing,” in Proc. ISLPED, 2010.
[19] Y. Zhang and A. Srivastava, “Leakage-aware kalman filter for accurate
temperature tracking,” in Proc. IGCC, 2011.
[20] J. L. Crassidis and J. L. Junkins, Optimal Estimation of Dynamic
Systems. CRC Press, 2004.
[21] F. Sebastiano, L. Breems, K. Makinwa, S. Drago, D. Leenaerts, and
B. Nauta, “A 1.2 v 10µw npn-based temperature sensor in 65nm cmos
with an inaccuracy of ±0.2oc from -70oc to 125oc,” in Proc. ISSCC,
2010.
